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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
WHITE PLAINS UNIT, WESTCHESTER CHAPTER, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 860, 
Charging Party. 
RAINS, POGREBIN & SCHER, ESQ. (BRUCE R. MILLMAN, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
GRAE & ROSE, ESQ. (ARTHUR H. GRAE, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
The charge herein was brought by the White Plains Unit, Westchester 
Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 860 (Local 860). It 
alleges that the City of White Plains (City) committed an improper practice by 
unilaterally altering a term and condition of employment when, on October 24, 
1978, it directed Roche, the president of Local 860, to work for it on a full-
time basis. Previously, Roche had been permitted to spend all his working time 
on the affairs of Local 860. The City contended that it did not unilaterally 
alter the term or condition of any employment because the obligation of Roche 
to work for it on a full-time basis had been exhaustively negotiated, and its 
directive to him was consistent with the parties' agreement. 
FACTS 
Local 860 and the City were parties to a series of collective agreements. 
In 1972, 1974 and 1976, Local 860 had submitted proposals for released time for 
Roche, and each time, the City successfully resisted the inclusion ~ 
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of the proposals into the agreement,.1:..= In 1974, the parties agreed that Roche 
could appear for grievants and otherwise assist in the administration of the 
_1 
agreement at times mutually acceptable to the parties. 
Despite its resistance to the Local 860 demands, the City had permitted 
Roche to spend his full time on CSEA affairs. In May, 1977, however, it advised 
him that, in the future, he would be required to request time off in accordance 
with the agreement. Shortly thereafter, the parties commenced negotiations for 
a new agreement to succeed the 1976-78 contract. Once again, Local 860 demanded 
that Roche be given full time off to handle its affairs, and, once again, the 
City resisted. This dispute became a major roadblock to agreement, with Local 
860 making several alternative compromise proposals, each of which was rejected 
by the City. 
1 This agreement was Section 3 of their contract. It has been carried into 
subsequent contracts. It provides: 
"Section 3. Rights of Representation 
1. Representatives of the Union shall have the right to visit the 
Employer's facilities for the purpose of adjusting grievances and 
administering the terms and conditions of this Agreement as long as 
they first make their presence known to an authorized representative 
of the Employer and further, that such visit does not interfere with 
the performance of customary duties. 
2. The President of the Union and/or his designees (stewards) shall 
have the right to assist and appear for any group or employee in the 
processing and adjustment of grievances and to assist in the adminis-
tration rights of the Agreement at a time mutually agreed to by the 
Employer and the Union. 
3. It is recognized that while grievances may be held outside working 
hours, requests by the Union for grievance meetings during work hours 
at times that will not unduly interfere with work operations and where 
the number of employees involved are limited to the aggrieved and the 
Union representative, shall not be unreasonably withheld." 
Board - U-3664 -3 
Shortly before the City was to submit the impasse for a legislative 
determination, Local 860 withdrew its demand for released time for Roche and 
stated that the withdrawal was "without prejudice". The City acknowledged the 
withdrawal, and the parties entered into an agreement which incorporated the 
past clause relating to the right of Roche to appear on behalf of grievants 
and otherwise assist in the administration of the contract at times mutually 
acceptable to the parties. 
THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION 
Local 860 maintained before the hearing officer that the effect of the 
withdrawal of its demand "without prejudice" was a return to the past practice 
whereby Roche was free to devote all his working time to its affairs. The . 
hearing officer rejected this position. He ruled that the right of Roche to 
time off in order to engage in union affairs had been exhaustively explored 
during negotiations and that the statement that the withdrawal of its demand 
was "without prejudice" was meaningless because Local 860 had knowingly yielded 
to the position of the City that Roche's right to time off would be as set 
forth in §3 of the contract. Accordingly, he dismissed the charge. 
DISEPSSION" 
Local 860 has filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision. The 
exceptions merely state the conclusion that the hearing officer erred in 
determining that it had lost its statutory right to negotiate by withdrawing 
its demand "without prejudice". No analysis of the record or legal arguments 
was: submitted in support of the exceptions. 
BQA 
Board - U-3664 
-4 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the hearing officer's findings of 
fact and his determination that Local 860 had knowingly agreed to accept the 
position of the City that Roche's right to time off would be as set forth in 
the former agreement. 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be and it hereby is dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 28, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
)&-+* /d-4u«^fl_-
Ida Klaus, Member 
<CL<./v,^ 
^ L 2 
David C. Randies, Member 
o> *M1 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF OYSTER BAY. 
Respondent, 
- and -
#2B-9/28/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3258 
NASSAU COUNTY CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
JOHN F. BOGUT, ESQ. (DAVID J. WEINBLATT, ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ., for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Nassau County Chapter, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) on April 10, 1978. It alleges that the 
Town of Oyster Bay (Town) violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it 
required employees in its Sanitation Department to collect bundled newspapers 
and to place them in baskets welded to the sides of the garbage trucks. The 
Town admitted that it unilaterally adopted a new system of collecting newspapers 
which imposed additional duties upon Sanitation employees. It argued, however, 
that the action taken by it was a management prerogative and, therefore, did 
not violate any duty to negotiate. 
FACTS 
The Sanitation employees, who are represented by CSEA, had been working 
1 
four days a week on a task completion basis.' This means; that a Sanitation 
employee may go home as soon as he has completed his round. Until 1972, the 
1 The agreement between CSEA and the Town treats the workday as being ten 
hours.. This does not reflect the time actually spent working but is 
significant for record-keeping purposes "that have, implications, for .accrual 
of time. 
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Sanitation Division collected all garbage, including old newspapers. In 1972, 
the Town instituted, on an experimental basis, the separate collection of old 
newspapers by Environmental Division employees for reprocessing and sale. From 
1975 through April, 1978, this became standard operating procedure. The amount 
of newsprint collected by the Environmental Division was dropping and the Town 
ascertained that, in part, the reason for this was that the collections by the 
Environmental Dl'yi's ion were not on a regular basis. In 1977, the Town concluded 
that the Sanitation Division could collect the newspapers more efficiently than 
the Environmental Drvi'sion and it initiated discussions with CSEA concerning a 
procedure whereby Sanitation employees would collect bundled newspapers at the 
curb every day from each home on their round and would place them in baskets 
srelded to Both sides of the garbage truck. During the ensuing negotiations, the 
Town and CSEA agreed that, as extra compensation for the additional assignment, 
Sanitation employees would receive half the revenue from the sale of the 
recycled newspapers. When submitted to the Sanitation employees for ratifica-
tion, this agreement was rejected by them. The Town then unilaterally required 
the Sanitation employees to collect the bundled newspapers daily and to place 
them in the baskets on the sides of the trucks. Thereafter, the Town and CSEA 
continued to meet in an effort to reach an agreement on the compensation of 
the Sanitation employees for the additional work, but they were unsuccessful 
and, after awhile, the negotiations ceased. 
THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION 
The hearing officer agreed with the Town that its assignment of the 
separate collection of bundled newspapers to Sanitation employees was a 
management prerogative and, therefore, not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Ee found support for his conclusion in our decision in Waverly Central School 
District, 10 PERB 113103, in which we held that an employer need not negotiate 
as to work assigned to employees that are aspects of the essential duties and 
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functions for which they were hired, He ruled that the collection of paper 
was such a duty and function of Sanitation employees. 
The hearing officer recognized that the change in the job assignment of 
the Sanitation employees might increase their workload or lengthen their 
workday. He, therefore, ruled that the Town was obligated to negotiate with 
CSEA regarding the impact of new assignments upon them. The hearing officer 
found, however, that the Town's participation in negotiations as to the 
compensation to be paid to the Sanitation employees for their new assignment 
satisfied its obligation to negotiate in good faith, and that those 
negotiations ceased when they were mutually abandoned by both parties. He also 
ruled that the failure of the parties to reach agreement during those 
negotiations did not prevent the Town from implementing its decision concerning 
the new assignment to Sanitation employees because a contrary holding would 
preclude the Town from exercising rights which it possessed. 
CSEA has filed exceptions to the decision of the hearing officer. 
DECISION 
Having read the record and considered the written and oral argument of 
the parties, we affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
hearing officer, 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed, 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 28, 1979. 
^^/ifin^ ^ / ^ f / ^ Aj H^t^ #4,<^ 
Harold R, Newman, Chairman 
< * . . * * * -
I d a K l a u s , Member 
Dafoid C, Rancfl.es, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WHITNEY POINT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
WHITNEY POINT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
#20-9/28/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3622 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI (JOHN HOGAN, Esq., of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
WILLIAM FINGER, for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Whitney Point Teachers Association 
(Association) on October 20, 1978. It alleges that the Whitney Point Central 
School District (District) violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when 
it refused to compensate teachers for graduate credits that were acquired after 
June 30, 1978. The District conceded that it refused to compensate teachers 
for graduate credits that were acquired after June 30, 1978, but it asserted 
that it was not regmired to do so. The hearing officer agreed and dismissed 
the charge. The case is before us on exceptions %o the hearing officer's deci-
sion that were filed by the Association. 
FACTS 
The Association and the District were parties to an agreement that 
expired on June 30, 1978. That agreement provided premium compensation to 
employees who earned graduate credits in blocks of fifteen. Negotiations for 
a contract to succeed the one expiring on June 30, 1978 commenced during 
February 1978. The continuation of premium pay for graduate credit hours was 
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not a factor during those negotiations. The parties had not reached an agree-
ment upon a successor contract and, at the time of the charge, they were con-
tinuing their efforts to reach an agreement through negotiations and with, the 
assistance of mediators and factfinders. 
During the 1978 summer vacation, several unit employees completed 
fifteen blocks of graduate credit hours and sought premium compensation for 
them upon the opening of school in September 1978. The District refused to 
provide the premium compensation and asserted that it was not required to do 
so. 
THE -.HEARING--' OFFICER* S •: BECISION 
The hearing officer agreed with the District. The basis for his 
decision was Rockland County BOCES v. PERB, 41 NY2d 753 (1977). In that deci-vo, 
sion, the Court of Appeals held that a public employer is not required to pay 
automatic annual salary increments after the expiration of an agreement. The 
hearing officer concluded that the ruling of the Court of Appeals would apply 
with equal force to premium pay for graduate credits earned by employees after 
the expiration of an agreement. He ruled that this conclusion was compelled by 
several prior hearing officer opinions that had been issued after the decision 
of the Court of Appeals, one of which, Carthage Central School District, 11 PERB 
114504 (1978) was affirmed by this Board, 11 PERB 1f305l (1978). 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that the hearing officer in 
this case and the decisions upon which he relied did not interpret Rockland 
County BOCES v. PERB correctly. It argues that Rockland County BOCES does not 
apply to payment for graduate hours. 
DISCUSSION 
We agree with the Association. Premium pay for graduate credits that 
are earned must be distinguished from annual salary increments which are 
automatic. To obtain automatic annual increments an employee need do no more 
than continue to work for his employer. By contrast, an employee earns premium 
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pay for graduate credit hours by embarking upon a program of formal study. Fif-
teen hours of graduate credits require an extended effort by an employee. In 
order to have completed a block of fifteen graduate credits in time to qualify 
for the premium pay sought in this charge, an employee would have commenced his 
studies while the prior agreement was still in effect. Benefits that are based 
upon conduct undertaken in reliance upon contract provisions then in effect, and 
which neither party to the contract is seeking to change, are not to be annulled 
merely because an agreement has expired. Such a benefit continues throughout 
1 
the period when the parties remain obligated to negotiate a successor agreement. 
The benefit of premium pay for earned graduate credits is such a benefit. As 
the subject of premium pay was not even placed in issue during the negotiations 
between the parties, it follows that they never exhausted their obligation to 
negotiate it. The unilateral change made by the District was, therefore, 
improper. 
The hearing officer decisions relied upon by the hearing officer do not 
establish a legal precedent for the application of Rockland County BOCES 
to premium pay for graduate credits earned by employees. While we did express 
approval of such an application of Rockland County BOCES in Carthage Central 
School District, supra, the issue was not fully considered by us in that case 
because it was decided on other grounds. The dispute in Carthage was over the 
meaning of a new contract. The employer asserted that the financial terms of 
the settlement included monies to be paid for new graduate credit hours, while 
the employee organization asserted that the money for new graduate credit hours 
1 Cf. Enlarged City School District of Troy, 11 PERB 1(3056 (1978), at p. 3087: 
"The significant factor is that there had been no serious nego-
tiations on the length of the teachers'•workday.,- and certainly 
no genuine deadlock reached as to it, prior to the unilateral 
change instituted by the respondent. Respondent had not even 
communicated to the charging party that the length of the teachers' 
workday was a concern of high priority to it. Before an employer 
may make a unilateral change in terms and conditions of employ-
ment of its employees, it must exhaust all available opportunities 
and efforts to do so through negotiations until a genuine deadlock 
occurs." 
Board - U-3622 -4 
was in addition to the amount specified in the settlement. We merely held that 
the disagreement between the parties must be resolved by the dispute mechanism 
established by the parties in their contract, and therefore, did not decide the 
case on the basis of any interpretation of Rockland County BOCES. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE determine that the Whitney Point Central School District 
violated its duty to negotiate in good faith in that, dur-
ing the period when it was negotiating an agreement to 
succeed one that expired on June 30, 1978, it unilaterally 
terminated premium pay for graduate credits earned by 
employees represented by Whitney Point Teachers Association, 
and 
WE ORDER it to provide"such premium pay,to the qualified affected. ~ 
employees retroactive to the date it was earned plus 
interest at the rate of three percent. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 27, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<3*eu Ad£tA*«--
Ida Klaus, Member 
P^JctSZZ. 
Davi d C. Randle s, Memb er 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKLAND COUNTY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent, 
-and-
TOWN OF HAVERSTRAW, 
Charging Party. 
#2D-9/28/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3979 
BRENT, PHILLIPS, DRANOFF & DAVIS, P.C. (RAYMOND G. 
KRUSE, ESQ., of Counsel) » for Respondent 
ARTHUR MOSKOFF, ESQ., for Charging Party 
The charge herein was brought by the Town of Haverstraw (Town) against 
the Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, Inc. (Association). 
It alleges that the Association violated its duty to negotiate in good faith 
by submitting a demand involving a nonmandatory subject of negotiation to an 
interest arbitration panel. As the dispute is one that primarily involves the 
scope of negotiations under the Taylor Law, it is being processed under §204.4 
of our Rules. This section permits the submission of a dispute directly to the 
Board without any report or recommendations from a hearing officer. 
The demand in question is: 
"Retirement after twenty (20) years of service at half 
pay shall be •provided by the Town at no cost to the 
employee (except as may be required by law). Final 
average salary shall be based on the last year of employ-
ment. " 
As we stated in a recent case involving these same parties, Town of 
Haverstraw, 11 PERB 1(3109 (at page 3178) : 
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"The negotiation of retirement benefits is generally 
prohibited by §201.4 of the Taylor Law. An exception 
is provided by §80, Chapter 565 of the Laws of 1978, 
which mandates the negotiation of those benefits that 
are provided by specified retirement systems for which 
no new enabling state legislation is required." 
We first ruled that demands for retirement benefits that are made 
available by current State law are mandatory subjects of negotiation in City 
of Albany (Police Officers), 7 PERB 1(3078 (1974) and City of Albany (Fire-
fighters) , 7 PERB 1(3079 (1974), aff'd City of Albany v. Helsby, 48 AD2d 998 
(3rd Dept., 1975), 8 PERB 1(7012, 38 NY2d 778 (1975), 9 PERB 1(7005. 
The benefits sought by the demand herein are made available by 
current State laws. Accordingly, we find it to be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. The demand is comprised of two parts. The first is for retire-
ment after twenty years at half pay. Such a retirement benefit is presently 
authorized, Retirement and Social Security Law §284-d. The second is for 
the final average salary to be based upon the last year of employment. Such 
a retirement benefit is presently authorized by Retirement and Social Security 
Law §203.9(d). 
The Town contends that even if the retirement benefits sought are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation, they may not be submitted to an arbitra-
tion panel because, with respect to retirement benefits, the scope of 
arbitration is narrower than the scope of negotiation. The basis for this 
contention is an alleged limitation imposed upon an arbitration panel by the 
State Constitution and the Taylor Law. Under the State Constitution, the 
grant to employees of improved retirement benefits is irrevocable, Article 5, 
5950 
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§7,— while 5209.4(c)(vi) of the Taylor Law provides that the determination of 
an arbitration panel shall be binding upon the parties for a period that may 
not exceed two years. The Town reasons that because a retirement benefit 
becomes permanent as soon as it takes effect, no such benefit can be imposed 
by an arbitration panel whose award may not extend beyond two years. 
In the early part of this decade, there was much concern that the cost of 
public employee pensions had become an excessive burden upon taxpayers. The 
Permanent Commission on Public Employee Pension and Retirement Systems issued 
reports on July 11, 1972, and on January 30, 1973, recommending limitations 
upon the retirement benefits that were being provided to public employees. In 
this context, it expressed frustration that, by reason of Article 5, §7 of the 
State Constitution, benefits once granted to an employee could not""be reduced 
or discontinued with respect to that employee subsequent to the effective date 
2 
of such benefit."— As a result of this concern, §201.4 of the Taylor Law was 
3 
amended in 1973 to prohibit the negotiation of retirement benefits.— Later in 
1973, however, the Legislature enacted a statute which permits the negotiation 
4 
of retirement benefits that do not require approval by the State legislature.— 
1 Art. 5, §7 reads: "After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in . 
any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof 
shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be 
diminished or impaired." 
2^  Report of the Permanent Commission on Public Employee Pension and Retirement 
Systems, January 30, 1973, p.5. 
_3 See Governor's Memorandum, McKinney's 1973 Session Laws, p. 2343. 
4^  L. '73, c.1046, §70. In pertinent part it provides: 
'"Notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this act or of any 
general or special law, during the period July first, nineteen hundred 
seventy-three to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-four: (a) a 
participating employer in the New York state employees' retirement sys-
tem or the New York state policemen's and firemen's retirement system 
shall continue to have the right to negotiate with its employees with 
respect to any benefit provided by or to be provided by such employer to 
such employees as members of such system and not requiring approval by 
act of the legislature;" 
Annually thereafter the Legislature has extended the duty to negotiate such 
retirement benefits. 
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Thus the Legislature chose to permit the negotiation of pension benefits, which, 
like those in this case, required no legislative authorization and were deemed 
to be irrevocable. 
Compulsory interest arbitration for police and firefighter negotiation 
disputes was provided by an amendment of the Taylor Law in the year following 
the enactment of the pension reform acts. It was a highly controversial amend-
ment for reasons having nothing to do with pension reform. Among the concerns 
that were then being expressed by both advocates and opponents of compulsory 
interest arbitration was that it might discourage collective bargaining.— The 
Legislature chose to make compulsory interest arbitration available to resolve 
police and firefighter negotiation disputes, but only for a specified period 
immediately following such a dispute. The determination of the arbitration 
panel was made retroactive to the termination of the previous agreement and 
would apply up to a maximum of two years from that termination date. 
The purpose of the two-year limitation, as we understand it, was to per-
mit the relationship of the parties to a deadlock in negotiations to survive 
the absence of an agreement during the deadlock period while preserving their 
duty to negotiate their own terms and conditions of employment thereafter. 
There is no indication that the Legislature intended the two-year limitation to 
restrict the arbitration of retirement benefits any more than the legislation 
of the preceding year restricted the negotiation of retirement benefits. Had 
the Legislature wished to do so, it could have enacted a law creating a 
narrower scope of arbitration than the scope of negotiation as it was fully 
5_ See Anderson, Arvid, "Compulsory Arbitration under State Statutes", 
Proceedings of the New York University Twenty-Second Annual Conference on 
Labor, Matthew Bender, 1970; McAvoy, Joan Z., "Binding Arbitration of 
Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public 
Sector", Columbia Law Review, Vol. 72 (1972), pp. 1192-1213; Howlett, Robert 
G., "Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector", Cincinnati 
Law Review, Vol. 42 (1973), pp. 47-75. 
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aware of the irrevocable nature of such benefits. Such limitations appear in 
statutes elsewhere. 
We determine that the Association committed no improper practice when 
it submitted the demand herein to an interest arbitration panel. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 27, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member / 
6_ See the laws of Rhode Island (Section 28-9.4-13 of the Rhode Island 
Municipal Employees Labor Relations Act provides that the decision of an 
arbitrator is only binding on matters not involving the expenditure of money) 
and Canada (Section 70 (1) of the Canadian Public Service Staff Relations Act 
provides that arbitration is limited to "rates of pay, hours of work, leave 
entitlement, standards of discipline and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment directly related thereto." This is narrower than the scope of 
negotiation under the statute). 
Also note that before the original police-fire arbitration statute was 
due to expire, this Board conducted a Symposium on December 1-3, 1976, eval-
uating the experience under that statute. One of the proposals to the 
Legislature made during that Symposium was that a distinction should be made 
between the scope of arbitration and the scope of negotiation (Symposium on 
Police and Firefighter Arbitration in New York State, Proceedings, p.161). 
When, in 1977, compulsory interest arbitration for police and firefighters 
was extended (L.'77, c.210), the prior statute was amended, but those amend-
ments did not address the problem of scope of arbitration. Thus, it allowed 
the scope of arbitration under §204.4(c)(vi) of the Taylor Law to be coexten-
sive with the scope of negotiation. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
: #2E-9/28/79 
CSEA, ERIE CHAPTER 815, : 
: BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Respondent, : 
- and - : CASE NO. U-3492 
RACHEL C. MARTIN, : 
Charging Party : 
KAVINOKY, COOK, SANDLER, GARDNER, WISBAUM 
§ LIPMAN, ESQ. (RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
RACHEL C. MARTIN, Charging Party, pro se 
The charge herein was filed by Rachel C. Martin on August 19, 1978. It 
alleges that CSEA, Erie Chapter 815 (CSEA) violated its duty of fairly repre-
senting her by improperly handling complaints and grievances that she had 
against her employer concerning out-of-title work. The hearing officer dis-
missed the charge on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, he 
determined that the charge was not timely. Substantively, he determined that 
CSEA committed no violation in that it gave due consideration to Martin's 
grievance and refused to process it because it concluded that the grievance 
lacked merit. This matter comes to us on Martin's exceptions to the hearing 
officer's decision. 
FACTS 
On November 8, 1976, Martin complained to her employer and to CSEA that 
she, a licensed practical nurse, was performing duties that were more properly 
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assigned to registered nurses. She received no satisfaction, and the situation 
was exacerbated on January 1, 1977, when 26 registered nurses were laid off by 
the County and their duties were assigned to licensed practical nurses, includ-
ing Martin. In early January, 1977, Martin again complained to CSEA, this time 
speaking directly to Clark, the CSEA grievance representative. Martin, Clark 
and the CSEA vice-president met with appropriate representatives of the employer 
to discuss her complaint concerning out-of-title work. At the meeting, she was 
told by the employer's representatives that she was obligated to.perform the 
duties previously performed by registered nurses without receiving premium pay. 
Thereafter, the CSEA representatives confirmed to Martin that the employer was 
acting within its contractual rights. 
Under the grievance procedure, Martin was required to file a written 
grievance within five working days after the meeting with her supervisors that 
occurred in January, 1977. She testified that she did not do so because she 
believed that Clark would file on her behalf. The hearing officer concluded, 
however, that Martin must have known in February, 1977, that no such grievance 
was filed because she would have received a written decision at that time. 
Martin continued to complain to Clark, but she did not ask whether any 
formal grievance had been filed0 Clark continued to tell her that there was 
no contractual basis for her grievance. Nevertheless, he did file a grievance 
on her behalf in December, 1977. It was rejected for late filing and CSEA 
decided not to carry it further. 
DISCUSSION, 
The hearing officer determined that the charge was not timely because it 
1 
ripened in February, 1977, and was not filed until 18 months later. He also 
determined that the charge should be dismissed because CSEA believed that 
1 We note, moreover, that even if the improper practice were deemed to have 
occurred as late as December 1977 when CSEA decided not to appeal the re-
jection of the grievance, the charge herein would still have been untimely. 
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Martin's grievance was without merit and it was under no obligation to process 
2 
such a grievance. 
Martin's exceptions do not indicate any facts nor do they advance any 
legal arguments that might cast doubt upon the decision of the hearing officer. 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclu-
sion of law, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 28, 1979 
Harold R.vNewman, Chairms 
CZ&A. /ChuAsQ-
Ida Klaus, Member 
'fad Q~< T^^c/C^</ 
David C. Randies,' Member 
The hearing officer concluded: "[Ejven if the charge were timely it 
would have to be dismissed. An employee organization interferes with 
an employee's rights in violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act when it acts negligently, irrespon-
sibly or with improper motivation in the processing of grievances. 
Brighton Transportation Association, 10 PERB 11 3090. It has no 
obligation to process a grievance which it does not believe to have 
merit. Scio-Allentown Teachers Association, 10 PERB f3050. The 
record evidence shows that CSEA did not process Martin's grievance 
because it believed it had no merit." 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON, 
- and -
Employer-Petitioner, 
BINGHAMTON FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 729, 
I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON, 
Employer-Petitioner, 
- and -
BINGHAMTON POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
#2F-9/28/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1686 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1687 
JOHN W. PARK, ESQ., for City of Binghamton 
BALL & McDONOUGH, P.C., for Binghamton 
Firefighters 
EARL D. BUTLER, P.C., for Binghamton 
Police Benevolent "Association, Inc. 
The two petitions herein were both filed by the City of Binghamton (City) 
Dn May 31, 1978. By the first (C-1686), it seeks to remove "permanently 
disabled" firemen from a unit of firemen represented by Binghamton Firefighters 
Local 729, I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO (I.A.F.F.). By the second (C-1687), it seeks to 
remove "permanently disabled" policemen from a unit of policemen represented by 
Binghamton Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (P.B.A.). For the purposes of 
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the two petitions, firemen and policemen who receive benefits under General 
Municipal Law §207-a or §207-c would be deemed to be permanently disabled. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissed both petitions, and the City has filed exceptions to his decision. 
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW §207-a AND §207-c 
General Municipal Law §207-a and §207-c respectively require that a public 
employer pay the full salary and certain other benefits to a fireman and '.police-
man who is injured or becomes ill in the performance of his duties. These bene-
1 
fits include any salary increases that are given to other firemen or policemen 
and coverage for certain hospital and medical expenses. Certain fringe benefits 
that may be provided bis other firemen and policemen pursuant to a collective 
agreement need not be extended to disabled firemen and policemen by reason of thf 
2 
General Municipal Law, but they have been extended to the disabled firemen and 
policemen who work for the City pursuant to the terms of the negotiated agree-
ments. 
Until January 1, 1978, there were two significant differences between 
statutory provisions applicable to firemen and policemen. First, the obligation 
of a public employer to pay a disabled policeman his full salary terminated when 
the policeman reached retirement age, but for a fireman, it continued indef-
initely. Second, the public employer could require a disabled policeman to 
perform light duties that are consistent with his status as a policeman, :but it 
could not impose a comparable requirement upon a disabled fireman. Thus, in 
1 Barber v. Lupton, 307 N.Y. 770 (1964), aff'g 282 App. Div. 1008 (4th Dept. 
1953); Birmingham v. Mirfington, 284 App. Div. 721 (4th Dept. 1954); Pease v. 
Colucci, 59 App. Div. 2d 233 (4th Dept. 1977); Devens v. Gokey, 18 Misc.2d 647 
(S. Ct. Oswego Co. 1958); Ellis v. Fife Chief of the City of Ithaca, 
29 Misc.2d 37 (S. Ct. Tompkins Co. 1961); 1976 Op. Atty. Gen. 120.; 1978 Op. 
State Compt. 31; 1978 Op. State Compt. 924; 1978 Op. State Compt. 926; 1959 
Op. State Compt. 979. 
2 . Phaheuf v. City of Plattsburgh, 84 Misc.2d 70 (S. Ct. Clinton Co. 1974), 
aff'd. mem., 50 App. Div. 2d 614 (3d Dept. 1975); Geremski v. Dept. of Fire of 
the City of Syracuse, 78 Misc.2d 555 (S. Ct. Onondaga Co. 1974); 1978 Op. 
State Compt. 489; 1977 Op. State Compt. 356; 1976 Op. State Compt. 429. 
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the case of a fireman who was partially but permanently disabled, a public 
employer was seriously disadvantaged in that it would have had to pay him for 
the rest of his life without being able to assign any alternative work to him. 
On January 1, 1978, however, this changed because General Municipal Law §207-a, 
applicable to firemen, was amended to conform to General Municipal Law 
3 
§207-c, applicable to policemen. 
DISCUSSION 
The City asserts that it has been paying benefits to more than 30 firemen 
and policemen pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a and §207-c, who have 
not worked for a period of time ranging from one to twenty-five years. It 
contends that these employees have no community of interest with firemen and 
policemen who are actively engaged in their occupations, because there is an 
inherent difference between employees who work and those who do not. It 
further contends that the disabled employees can no longer be deemed firemen 
or policemen because an essential characteristic of those two occupations is 
the hazard to which incumbents are exposed, and disabled employees are not 
exposed to those hazards. 
The arguments of the City do not convince us that disabled firemen and 
policemen should be removed from the negotiating units of the active firemen 
and policemen. Disabled firemen and policemen are public employees, City of 
Binghamton, 10 PERB 1(3092 (.1977). It is also clear that they continue to be 
policemen and firemen respectively within the meaning of General Municipal Law 
§207-a. It repeatedly refers to disabled employees who are subject to its 
provisions as firemen and indicates that they are members of the fire company 
or fire department of the public employer that hired them. Subdivision 3 of 
that Section, which authorizes the assignment of light duty, requires that 
3 L. 1977, ch. 965. 
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"such light duty shall be consistent with his status as a fireman..." General 
Municipal Law §207-c contains parallel language with respect to policemen. 
It is clear that General Municipal Law §207-a and §207-c maintain the 
status of the disabled employees as firemen and policemen respectively, and 
that, as such, they guarantee for them the salary increases and some other 
benefits of the active firemen and policemen. This indicates a continuing 
community of interest between active and disabled firemen and policemen. 
Further supporting the conclusion of the Director that there is a community of 
interest between the injured and active employees, we note that there is no 
clearly discernible line of demarcation between them. A fireman or policeman 
who is active today may tomorrow suffer an injury in the performance of his 
duties, A fireman or policeman who is today inactive by reason of a dis-
ability may tomorrow be assigned light duty, or he may even recover 
sufficiently to assume his full responsibilities. Accordingly, both active 
and disabled firemen or policemen have an interest in the benefits of the 
other group. 
We are not unsympathetic to the concern of the City that firemen and 
policemen employed by them who are, indeed, permanently disabled should be 
removed from the list of active employees. This, however, is a statutory 
problem for which the City must turn to the procedures in General Municipal 
Law §207-a and §207-c. However, until such employees are retired or otherwise 
relieved of their status as employees, they continue to be firemen and police-
men respectively and continue to have a sufficient community of interest with 
active firemen and policemen to remain in negotiating units with them. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Director, and 
WE ORDER that the petitions herewith be and 
they hereby are dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 28, 1979 
-=^//?^J^> J/ / ^ ALCU^U?/$
 t . 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ju, JdL 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
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NASSAU COUNTY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
-and-
Respondent, //2G-9/28/79 
CASE NO. U-3400 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 
-and-
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-3436 
SUFFOLK COUNTY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
EDWARD G. McCABE, ESQ... (PETER A. BEE, ESQ.,-of 
Counsellor Nassau';County . :; 
KIMMEL & KIMMEL (LEONARD KIMMEL, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Suffolk County 
HARTMAN & LERNER (DAVID SCHLACHTER, ESQ.,of 
Counsel), for the Charging Parties 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge in Case No. U-3400 was filed by the Nassau County Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association (N-PBA) on June 28, 1978. It alleges thkt the County of 
Nassau violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it invited a representa-
tive of Suffolk County to be present at negotiating sessions between N-PBA and 
Nassau County. Er^ <T»<p-
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The charge in Case No. U-3436 was filed by the Suffolk County Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association (S-PBA) on July 25, 1978. It alleges that the County of 
Suffolk violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it invited a repre- . 
sentative of Nassau County to be present at negotiating sessions between S-PBA 
and Suffolk County. 
FACTS 
Nassau County and N-PBA were parties to a collective agreement which 
terminated on December 31, 1978. Suffolk County and S-PBA were also parties to 
a collective agreement which terminated on the same day. Before commencing 
negotiations for successor agreements with N-PBA and S-PBA respectively, the ; 
County Executives of Nassau County and Suffolk County issued a joint statement 
on March 31, 1978. In that statement, they said that the two counties would 
"coordinate their efforts in labor negotiations with municipal employees" with 
particular emphasis placed on contract negotiations with their respective 
police unions. As part of this plan, they said that each county would "send 
observers to sit in the other's negotiating session. In that way, each county 
will have a thorough knowledge of each union's bargaining positions." Finally, 
they said that they would also coordinate their mutual efforts with those 
villages and towns in the two counties which maintain their own police forces. 
The first negotiating session between Nassau County and N-PBA occurred on 
May 26, 1978. Kevin Darcy, an employee in the Office of Labor Relations of the 
County of Suffolk was present at those negotiations at the invitation of Nassau 
County, and N-PBA was advised that he was a member of the Nassau County 
negotiating team, N-PBA objected to his presence, but Darcy remained and 
continued to attend most of the subsequent negotiating sessions. 
The first negotiating session between Suffolk County and S-PBA occurred on 
July 21, 1978. William Mairs, an employee in.the Office of Labor Relations of 
ithe County of Nassau was present at those negotiations at the invitation of 
Suffolk County, and S-PBA was advised he was a member of the Suffolk County 
EQRQ 
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negotiating team. S-PBA objected to his presence, but Mairs remained and con-
tinued to attend most of the subsequent negotiating sessions. 
As the two charges raise identical issues of law, they were consolidated for 
decision by the hearing officer. 
THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION AND THE EXCEPTIONS 
The hearing officer determined that the Taylor Law does not prohibit a 
public employer from appointing an employee of another public employer to its 
negotiating team. He further found that in the instant case, the appointment of 
Darcy and Mairs to the negotiating teams of Nassau County and Suffolk County, 
respectively, did not inhibit the ability of either county to reach an agreement 
with the representatives of their police employees. Accordingly, he dismissed 
the two charges. 
In their joint exceptions, N-PBA and S-PBA argue that Darcy and Mairs were 
abservers rather than members of the negotiating teams of Nassau and Suffolk 
bounties, and they assert that a public employer commits an improper practice 
srhen it insists upon the presence of a third party during negotiations over the 
abjections of the employee organization. As an alternative argument, N-PBA and 
3-PBA contend that it would be an improper practice for Nassau County and Suffolk 
bounty to appoint Darcy and Mairs to their respective negotiating teams because 
'a labor organization has a right to bargain with the employer of a unit it rep-
resents and it should not be required to bargain with any other employers." 
DISCUSSION 
Although the plan originally announced by the Nassau and Suffolk County 
executives on March 31, 1978 was to send "observers" to each others' police 
legotiations, when those negotiations commenced, Darcy and Mairs were introduced 
as members of the negotiating teams. N-PBA and S-PBA, the charging parties here-
in, have failed to meet their burden of proving thexr.charges that Darcy 
and Mairs were not members of the negotiating teams of Nassau and Suffolk 
bounties, respectively. There is nothing in the record describing the roles 
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actually played by Darcy and Mairs during negotiations and, therefore, we cannot 
conclude that they were anything other than what the counties said they were, 
members of the respective negotiating teams. 
We affirm the hearing officer's conclusion of law that the two counties did 
not violate the Taylor Law when they designated employees of the other county 
• 1 . 
to serve on their respective negotiating teams. It is well settled that as a 
general matter each party may designate whomever it desires to represent it in 
aegotiations, General Electric Co. v. NLEB, 417 F2d 512, 71 LRRM 2418 (CA2,1969); 
2 
Standard Oil Co. v. NLEB, 322 F2d 40, 54 LREM 2076 (CA6, 1963). A comparison 
of wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment of employees in 
1 In view of our determination that Darcy and Mairs were members of the 
negotiating, teams, we need not reach the question whether it would have 
been improper for the Counties to insist upon their presence as observers 
of negotiations as a condition; for its participating in such negotiations. 
We do note, however, that there is support in the private sector for the 
-. opinion of the Counsel of this Board (11 PERB 115006 [1978]) that a party 
to negotiations may not so insist upon the presence of observers. A 
decision of the NLEB holds that such a matter is a threshold, issue prelimi-
nary and subordinate to substantive negotiations which should not be 
permitted to interfere with negotiations, Bartlett-Cdllins Co., 99 LRRM 1034 
(1978). 
We also note that the New York State Freedom of Information and Open 
Meetings Laws respect the confidentiality of the negotiating process by 
excluding collective negotiations from their application, Public Officer's 
Law, Sections 87.2(c) and 100.1(e). 
2 The courts have recognized that the right of a party to choose its own bar-
gaining representatives is not absolute. In Standard Oil v. NLRB the court 
said: "If there are unusual or exceptional circumstances management may 
make a valid objection to some agent or representative presented by the 
Union for bargaining." In General Electric v. NLRB the court said: "There 
have been exceptions to the general rule that either side can choose its 
bargaining representatives freely, but they have been rare and confined to 
situations so infected with ill-will, usually personal, or conflict of 
interest as to make good faith bargaining impractical." See also IBEW v. 
NLRB, 557 F2d 995, 95 LERM 2996 (CA2, 1977) in which the court stated the 
test in terms of "a 'clear and present danger' to the collective bargaining 
process." 
None of the stated bases for an exception to the general rule is appli-
cable in this case. 
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adjacent communities who perform similar services which require similar skills 
is a significant factor in negotiations. As employees in the Office of Labor 
Relations of Suffolk and Nassau Counties, respectively, Darcy and Mairs could 
provide such information to their fellow members of the negotiating teams of 
Nassau County and Suffolk County. Nassau County and Suffolk County commit no 
improper practice when they seek people with such a capability to serve on 
their negotiating teams. 
NOW THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charges herein be 
and they hereby are dismissed. 
Dated at Albany, New York 
September 27, 1979 
VtkzteP/?J[JL. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Id. Kl»s, Me.be, 
David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATK BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
E m p l o y e r , 
#3B-9/28/79 
C a s e No. C-1'921 -and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,. 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding.having been.conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the. 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the. 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS'HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of • ' 
Teachers, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above.named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances-. 
Unit: Included: School Medical Inspectors including Substitutes. 
Excluded: School Medical Director; Assistant School 
Medical Director; and all other employees 
of the Board of Education. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED" that the above named public j 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation ! 
of -Teachers, American Federation of Teachers, ~AFL-CIO i 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee/organization: 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment,- and shall i 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the ' 
j determination of,'and administration of, grievances. • 
! 
|, Signed on the 28th day of September , 1979 
r Albany,- New York 
f/l^L-' 'J'sWS-^'Z'ttZ-
Harold R.' Newman, Chairman 
.- ?oard_Member Klaus did not p a r t i c i p a t e 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
^1-^1 
David C. Handles, Membqr 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIC BOARD 
#3A-9/29/79 
C a s e No. C-1925 
In the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer, 
- and — 
ONEIDA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES UNITED, NYSUT, 
. - P e t i t i o n e r . 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e m a t t e r by t h e P u b l i c Employment R e l a t i o n s Board i n a c c o r d -
a n c e w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t and t h e 
R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e of t h e B o a r d , and i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d , 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e Boa rd by t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t , • 
I T I S HEREBY CERTIFIED t h a t Oneida School Employees 
i United, NYSTJT j 
! has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
\ of the above namea public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
j the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
! tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
i ment of grievances. 
Unit: Included: 
All cus todians~~and~cle anersV " • • 
Excluded: | 
Head maintenance mechanic (Superintendent of Building and Grounds), j 
temporaries, "casuals, per diem subs t i t u t e s and confident ial employees. j 
F u r t h e r , IT I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e named p u b l i c j 
e m p l o y e r s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h Oneida School Employees j 
United, NYSUT ' ' •• ] 
i 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization• 
: with regard to terms and conditions cf employment, and shall 
I negotiate collectively with such employee organisation in the ! 
1 determination of, and administration of, grievances. . • 
. S i g n e d on t h e 26th . d a y o f September 1979-
@*f1H&{<&*< 
Harold R. .Newman', Chairman 
Board Member Klaus did not p a r t i c i p a t e 
I d a Klaus , , Member" : 
/V^uj^CtL 
David C« Handle 
